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Abstract. Russian petroleum industry plays a vital part in both the country’s economy and international
hydrocarbon market, providing a third of state budget revenues and over 13% of global liquid hydrocarbon ex-
ports. Yet, nowadays the industry is facing a number of serious challenges, which threaten to undermine its
sustainability. These challenges include depletion of the conventional oil resources, technological and economic
sanctions and stagnating demand for liquid fuels, especially apparent in Russian traditional export destinations
– Europe. The authors attempted to evaluate the impact of these issues and compile a forecast of Russian oil
industry using state-of-the-art modelling tools. The calculations show, that even under fairly negative scenario
assumptions, Russia is capable of maintaining crude oil and reﬁned products exports above 250 mtoe up to
2040, remaining the world’s second liquid hydrocarbon supplier. This, however, is still a huge drop from
425 mtoe of exports in 2018. To ensure sustainability the government and oil companies need to work in con-
junction in several ﬁelds: facilitate geologic survey of conventional and promising oil and gas basins; domestic
development of new oil extraction technologies for accessing unconventional and low-margin oil resources; pro-
vide transport infrastructure for remote ﬁelds; reforming tax system to better suit the new environment. This
way, crude production can be maintained above 500 mtoe in the forecast period and exports even surpass 2018
levels. In any case, however, the need for massive investments and tax incentives coupled with global movement
away from fossil fuels means, that in the future oil will be becoming less and less proﬁtable for the state budget,
thus Russian government needs to redouble efforts on economic diversiﬁcation and energy transition.
1 Introduction
Russia is historically one of the major players in the global
liquid hydrocarbons market, maintaining a position among
the world’s top three in crude oil and reﬁned products out-
put and exports for many years (Makarov et al., 2016). Yet,
as of late, the country is facing a number of serious chal-
lenges, both internal and external in nature, threatening
to undermine its status. The internal factors include:
 Scarcity of the resource base, readily available for
commercial development (Bushuev et al. 2010; Hen-
derson and Grushevenko, 2017; Minenergo of Russia,
2017; Mitrova and Grushevenko, 2017).
 Lack of domestic technology for accessing the offshore
and unconventional oil resources and providing efﬁ-
cient reﬁning (Kapustin and Grushevenko, 2016,
2018a; Kulagin et al., 2015).
 Remoteness of prospective production areas from both
domestic consumption centers and major export corri-
dors (Henderson and Mitrova, 2016).
The external factors are the following:
 Mounting competition in the global oil market,
becoming especially acute since the US shale oil boom
(Dyl, 2018; Medlock et al., 2018).
 Declining demand in the traditional European
market.
 Sanctions, imposed by the US and the EU, hurdling
import of crucial technologies and capital (Mitrova
et al., 2018; Nephew, 2019).
 Looming “Energy transition” capable of causing a glo-
bal fossil fuels demand peak in the foreseeable future
(IRENA, 2018; O’Connor, 2010).
The goal of this study is to access the gravity of the
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outlook on the Russian oil sector’s development, crude oil
and reﬁned products output and exports up to 2040 under
the given conditions, using the state-of-the-art mathemati-
cal modelling tools, developed by ERI RAS.
2 Methods
For the purposes of this study the authors have imple-
mented energy modelling complex SCANER, developed
by ERI RAS research team (Makarov, 2011). The complex
is comprised of multiple interconnected models, providing
means for analyzing and forecasting all aspects of energy
use related activities for both Russia and the world. For this
particular research a number of modelling blocks were used
most extensively:
 For the sake of forecasting liquid fuel demand a com-
plex modelling tool combining “top-down” “bottom-
up” was utilized, described in Mitrova et al. (2015)
and Grushevenko et al. (2018b);
 Crude oil production capacity for brownﬁeld and
greenﬁeld projects was calculated using the Hubbert
linearization approach covered by Mohr and Evans
(2010) and Michaelides (2017);
 Russian oil reﬁning forecasting is handled via simula-
tion model, described by the authors in Kapustin and
Grushevenko (2018a);
 The overall balance of Russian oil sector was com-
posed through the application of World Oil Model
(WOM). WOM is a static optimization model of full
equilibrium. The model uses an extensive database,
containing information on crude oil and NGL produc-
tion capacities, oil reﬁneries capacities, liquids trans-
portation capacities and other characteristics of the
petroleum industry as source data. The model covers
the entire production chain of the oil market from
extraction of crude to the production and marketing
of petroleum products and alternative liquid fuels
(Kapustin and Grushevenko, 2018b). Full description
of the calculation algorithm is presented in the previ-
ous work by the authors (Kapustin and Grushevenko,
2017).
3 Outlining the challenges and formulating
scenario assumptions
3.1 Internal factors
3.1.1 Oil production
In 2018 Russia came world’s second in terms of oil produc-
tion with 55 584 mtoe, yet the country’s current proven
reserves of about 15 billion tons of oil equivalent (BP,
2018) place it only at 6th place. This disparity casts serious
doubt on the long-term sustainability of production and
export levels, which is one of the priority goals for the indus-
try by Russian government, as evidenced by Russian energy
strategy up 2035 project (Minenergo of Russia, 2017).
Shrinking production capacities have been noted by
both domestic (Makarov et al. 2016; Mitrova et al. 2018;
Vygon and Kozlova, 2018) and international researcher
(EIA, 2018; IEA, 2018). The author’s analysis of over a
hundred of Russian brownﬁelds and most promising green-
ﬁeld projects has shown a considerable reduction of produc-
tion capability to just around 350 mtoe (excluding
condensate) by 2040 (Fig. 1).
The underlying reasons are fairly obvious. Firstly, the
decline of major ﬁelds in Volga-Ural and West Siberian
basins, providing up to half of Russian oil output, is becom-
ing increasingly hard to contain. Many ﬁelds produce an
average of over 80% water at wellhead, legacy of dubious
production intensiﬁcation practices of the late Soviet era
and the 90’s. At the same time, current greenﬁeld projects
lack in scale to truly replace the ailing giants, granting only
a temporary boost in production (Henderson and
Grushevenko, 2017), while prospective resources mostly
consist of unconventional oil or are located in remote,
hard-to-access areas, such as East Siberia and the Arctic
shelf and are not readily available for development.
In addition to resource base constraints, other issues
subsist. Firstly, much of the Russian pipeline infrastruc-
ture is geared towards transporting West Siberian oil
towards the most populous European parts of the country
and further, to the western borders, while the prospec-
tive resources of East Siberia and Russian Far East are
still pretty much stranded. The ESPO pipeline (see
Appendix I), which has been conceived as a mean to allevi-
ate this problem has been operating at its full capacity of
58 million tons annually since 2016 (Onopriyk, 2017), limit-
ing further developments in the region. The expansion of
the transport corridor faces a typical “infrastructural para-
dox”: government owned oil pipeline grid owner and opera-
tor Transneft is wary of making costly investment in
further large-scale expansion under uncertain production
growth prospects, while oil companies are wary of exploring
and developing eastern basins with no viable means of actu-
ally delivering the crude to the consumers.
Secondly, average production costs of Russian crude are
on the rise. During the oil price crisis of 2014–2016 Russian
companies managed to drastically cut expenses. Rosneft,
for instance, reported a staggering 72% reduction of
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Fig. 1. Conventional oil production capacity outlook. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
N.O. Kapustin and D.A. Grushevenko: Oil & Gas Science and Technology - Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 72 (2019)2
operational expenses and 19% reduction of net capital
expenses in 2016 compared to 2013 (Rosneft, 2014, 2017).
It was made possible by the devaluation of national cur-
rency and the reduction of tax burden due to the ﬂexible
Russian MET calculation system (EY, 2018; Grigoriev
et al., 2018). However, by 2019 these options have
exhausted themselves, and in 2018 the net OPEX and
CAPEX have grown by 30 and 40% respectively. It is worth
noting, that these dynamics were not exclusive to Russia.
The fall of oil prices in 2014–2016 has forced most oil pro-
ducers to cut capital and operational costs, which started
to recover only recently (Fig. 2).
On average, the pre-tax uplifting costs of Russian oil are
estimated at 25 $/boe (Koroleva, 2019), which is still
among the world’s lowest, with only Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Iraq producing cheaper (WSJ News Graphics, 2016).
Add taxes and transport, however, and the ﬁgure doubles,
placing Russian oil in the middle of the cost curve (Fig. 3).
Moreover, most of the high-proﬁle Greenﬁeld projects, to
some extent, beneﬁt from tax cuts, thus each new barrel
of oil generates less income for the federal budget still very
much reliant on hydrocarbon revenues. Without the tax-
cuts, however, the low-margin projects come to a halt in
a volatile price environment, as was the case with Tatarstan
heavy oil in 2016, or are not launched at all.
On top of the resource base and economic issues,
Russian oil industry suffers from technological deﬁciency,
which was aggravated by sanctions by the US and EU.
While undoubtly well-versed in conventional oil production,
stemming from over a century of expertise, Russian oil
industry has only recently faced the need to develop uncon-
ventional and offshore resources. After the turmoilous
period of the 90s, oil industry was one of the ﬁrst to recover.
This was in no small part due to extensive cooperation with
foreign ﬁrms. In fact, by 2014 up to 80% of the needs of
Russian oil industry were covered by imports (Molodtsov,
2018), thus, international cooperation appeared as a
go-to solution to tap into the vast new reserves. This
included the exploration and development of arctic shelf,
culminating with the launch of Prirazlomnoye ﬁeld project
in 2013 (Gazprom, 2019), but even more importantly
attempts at tackling the vast Bazhen formation, potentially
containing billions upon billions tons of oil in tight bedrock,
thus earning itself moniker “Russian Bakken” (Kapustin
and Grushevenko, 2018b; Mitrova, 2013; RusEnergy,
2013). Known since the 70’s but thought to be inaccessible;
Bazhen re-emerged in expert discussions as the potential
source of crude since the US tight oil boom. Russian produc-
ers sought to adopt the US expertise by establishing joint
ventures with such companies as ExxonMobil, Shell and
Dowell Schlumberger. With the introduction of sanctions
in 2014 all of these projects were put on hold or cancelled
(Tab. 1). However, the current volumes of production have
not yet been affected, as the launch dates of those projects
were scheduled beyond 2020. Currently, the start of produc-
tion at Bazhen using strictly domestic technology is
expected no earlier than 2025 and only if operating costs
are reduced below 20 $/boe (Kobzeva, 2018).
The situation is not without upsides, however. Realizing
the challenges faced by the industry, Russian government is
developing a tax reform. Since 2016 a number of projects
have been greenlighted to voluntarily shift from the conven-
tional production based mineral extraction tax (MET,
known as “HLGB” in Russia) to a more advanced Proﬁt
Based Tax (PBT), which is calculated based on the cash
ﬂow of the project. This move is expected to be beneﬁcial
for both producers and the government, as it effectively
provides lowered taxation at the early phases of develop-
ment, incentivizing investment into high-cost, low-margin
ﬁelds, which would otherwise be left untouched, while
ensuring higher taxes in the later stages, after the initial
capital expenses have paid off (EY, 2018; Vygon et al.,
2017).
The government sponsored import replacement pro-
grams, that have been initiated in 2015, at the heights of
political crisis, have begun to bear fruit. The share of
imports of heavy machinery has dropped to around 50%,
while domestic ﬁrms have increased turnover by almost
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Fig. 2. Global Upstream Capital Cost Index (UCCI) and Upstream Operational Cost Index (UOCI). Source: IHS Markit.
N.O. Kapustin and D.A. Grushevenko: Oil & Gas Science and Technology - Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 72 (2019) 3
30%, increasing both domestic sales and exports. Import
substitution has stimulated pipe production, including
large diameter pipes that have not been manufactured in
Russia before. The software for geologic surveys and
hydraulic fracturing is also being actively developed
(Molodtsov, 2018).
The other positive is gas condensate. In 2018 its share in
the overall liquid hydrocarbon production amounted to 7%.
As gas production in Russia is set to grow and more of it
will be “wet” gas, so will condensate output increase in the
foreseeable future, contributing to oil production.
For the sake of further calculations total production
capacity of Russia has been split into ﬁve distinct groups:
1st – conventional brownﬁelds and greenﬁelds with pro-
duction costs of 25 $/boe;
2nd – gas condensate is a by-product of the gas industry,
thus the production volumes are input exogenously at
zero production cost;
3rd – conventional ﬁelds, situated in Russian Eastern
Siberia and Far East, the development of which hinges
on the expansion of ESPO;
4th – high-cost, low-margin ﬁelds, that require tax
incentives, known in Russia as TPBP (rus. Tpylyob
pdkeraevse Pagacs – hard-do recover reserves);
5th – oil from Bazhen formation, recoverable only
through the development of appropriate extraction
technologies.
Our estimations show that full utilization of all the
aforementioned production capacities can, in fact, ensure
relatively stable production up to 2040 (Fig. 4). However,
the actual realization of this potential will be determined
by the demands of domestic and export markets, which will
be discussed below.
3.1.2 Oil reﬁning and domestic demand
Just under a half of crude oil, produced in Russia is exported
(275 million out of 555 annually), while the rest is reﬁned
domestically. Russia is also one of the world’s top reﬁned
products exporter, with over 120 mtoe supplied to the glo-
bal market. At the same time, since 2014 reﬁning volumes
in Russia are in decline. After a period of lenient taxation,
that has stimulated rapid development of the sector over
almost a decade, the new policy is aimed at downsizing oil
reﬁning, cutting inefﬁcient and excessive capacities, since,
as demonstrated by ERI RAS research from 2014 and
2016, crude exports have easier time ﬁnding market niches
and, at the same time, generate more proﬁts for both oil
companies and the government, especially since Russian
products export mix is dominated by middle distillates
(diesel) and residues (fuel oil, vacuum gas oil). The dynam-
ics of Russian oil reﬁning sector and its prospects has been
discussed in more detail in the previous research by the
authors (Kapustin and Grushevenko, 2018a). For the sake
of this research it is worth noting, that the differentiated
tax rates, that have put extra burden on the residue produc-
tion have the potential of putting a whole quarter of
Russian 300 million tons reﬁning capacity out of business.
Only the most technologically outﬁtted and efﬁcient reﬁner-
ies are competitive in the current environment, constituting
about 220–250 million tons of primary capacity.
There is, however, a natural limit for reﬁning reduction
which is dictated by the domestic demand. Ensuring a
steady and abundant supply of motor fuels to the Russian
market at relatively low prices is the cornerstone of the gov-
ernment’s policy for oil reﬁning in the interests of energy
security and social stability (Kapustin and Grushevenko,
2018a). Thus, crude reﬁning will always be at least at levels
sufﬁcient for covering the internal demand for gasoline and
jet fuel.
Fig. 3. Global cost curve. Source: Paton (2018).
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Table 1. Projects, stranded due to sanctions.
Project Participants Description Current status
Joint shelf projects affected by the sanctions
Universitetskaya-1 well
(Kara Sea) and
Tuapsinskoye ﬁeld in the
Black Sea
Joint venture between
Rosneft (51%) and Exxon
(49%)
In 2011 Exxon and Rosneft had formed
an alliance to explore and develop
potentially vast but largely untapped
reserves of Russian Arctic and Black
Sea shelves. In September 2014
exploratory well drilled in the Kara Sea
established the presence of signiﬁcant
oil and gas resources.
Postponed
However, following the second round of
sanctions adopted just a few days
before the discovery; ExxonMobil
suspended the project and withdrew
from Russian joint ventures, writing off
$1 billion.
Projects: Vostochno-
Prinovozemelsky – 1, 2, 3;
Severo-Karsky And Ust-
Oleneksky; Ust-Lensky;
Anisina-Novosibirsky;
Severo-Wrangelevsky – 1, 2,
3; Yuzhno-Chukotsky;
The Tuapse Deﬂection
Joint venture between
Rosneft (67%) and Exxon
(33%)
Exxon withdrew from the ventures in
accordance with sanctions regulations.
Rosneft announced
independent
development of the
projects
Two objects in the Barents
sea and Val-Shatskoye ﬁeld
in the Black sea
Joint venture between
Rosneft (67%) and ENI
(33%)
In 2012, Rosneft and ENI signed an
agreement on joint development of
offshore ﬁelds in the Barents and Black
seas.
Postponed
Joint unconventional oil projects, affected by the sanctions
Bazhen and Achimov
formations in the Western
Siberia
Joint venture Trizneft Pilot
SARL between Rosneft
(51%) and Exxon (49%)
The companies planned joint
evaluation of commercial development
potential of unconventional oil of
Bazhen and Achimov formations.
ExxonMobil planned to invest
300 million dollars.
Postponed
Development of Domanik
deposits in Orenburg region
Joint venture between
Rosneft (51%) and BP
(49%)
BP planned to compensate part of
Rosneft’s past investment in Domanik
deposits exploration and provide carry
ﬁnancing up to $300 million. The pilot
program was to be be implemented in
two stages.
Postponed
Development of the Bazhen
formation in Khanty-
Mansiysk
Joint venture between
LUKOIL and Total
Companies planned joint exploration
of three shale formations: Vostochno-
Kovenskoye, Tashinskoye and
Lyaminskoye in Khanty-Mansiysk.
The investments were estimated at
120–150 million dollars.
Total transferred
its share in the
project to LUKOIL
Development of the Bazhen
formation in Khanty-
Mansiysk
Khanty-Mansiysk oil and
gas Union JV between Shell
(50%) and Gazprom Neft
(50%)
JV received permits for the exploration
of Uilsky-4, Uilsky-5 and Yuzhno-
Lungorsky-1 sites in Khanty-Mansiysk.
Shell suspended
activities on the
project
Source: SKOLKOVO Business School Energy Centre (SEneC).
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The domestic demand itself is slowing down, with
struggling economy offering little grounds for substantial
growth, while the government’s efforts for fuel mix diversi-
ﬁcation put additional downwards pressure on conventional
fuels as demonstrated in author’s previous research
(Grushevenko et al., 2018a). The future dynamics of the
internal market will be instrumental for calculating the
overall forecast of Russian oil sector. It and resource base
assumptions will be covered in the following section.
3.1.3 Internal scenario assumptions
Summarizing the above, the following parameters have
been identiﬁed as critical for developing a forecast of
Russian oil sector: production capacity; reﬁning capacity;
domestic demand. Consequently, two scenarios have been
formulated along these parameters, representing the general
routes, which the development of Russian oil industry may
adopt:
1. Baseline scenario, which is mostly a business-as-usual
scenario. The rate of technological progress is slug-
gish, resulting in slower introduction of alternative
fuels and energy efﬁcient transport, and therefore
higher overall domestic liquid fuel demand. At the
same time, lack of technologies means that Bazhen
formation and some of the costlier resources are not
tapped into in the forecast period, limiting production
potential.
2. Technological scenario assumes grassroots technologi-
cal breakthrough in Russia, despite the sanctions and
other limitations, allowing to fully utilize oil produc-
tion potential, including LTO, simultaneously limit-
ing oil products demand due to wider application of
alternative fuels, mainly natural gas and LPG.
Domestic demand ranges from 155 to 141 mtoe across
scenarios respectively, depending on the rate of displace-
ment of conventional motor fuels, as mentioned before
(Fig. 5). The relatively small difference between scenarios
is due to the peculiarity of Russian domestic market,
namely low elasticity of demand, which has been noted in
author’s previous research (Grushevenko et al., 2018a, b).
Thus, the impact of factors, such as pricing, GDP and gov-
ernment legislations is very limited.
3.2 External factors
As Russian oil industry is mostly export-oriented, making a
meaningful forecast would be impossible without taking
into account the shifting demand of international market
and other external factors that can make or break the
sector’s development. For the sake of this study the
authors required a balanced scenario of global energy
development in the forecast period, built to avoid either
the overestimation of potential oil demand (as with the
Current Policies scenario of World Energy Outlook [IEA,
2017] or Baseline scenario of OPEC World Oil Outlook
[OPEC 2016]), or excessive optimism about the transition
to “New Energy” (like the scenarios of (DNV GL, 2018)
or (McKinsey, 2019), which assume peak oil demand
around 2020).
As such, the authors have used the “Probable” scenario
of Global and Russian Energy Outlook 2016 (Makarov
et al., 2016). This scenario assumes a fairly inertial route
of the world’s development, which leaves enough room for
Russia to adapt to its speciﬁc issues, described above and
maintain a signiﬁcant role global energy, at the same time
providing enough outside challenges to tests the sustainabil-
ity of the country’s related industries, in this case, oil sector
and put reasonable limits on its expansion. In quantitative
terms the scenario assumes that the global oil demand
increases over the whole of the forecast period, albeit at
decelerating pace, from 4391 mtoe in 2017 to 4751 mtoe
in 2040, while oil prices remain at 65 US$/boe until
2020, then gradually increase to 90 US$/boe by 2040. A
more detailed description of scenario is presented in
Table 2.
4 Results and discussions
The calculations show that Russia most probably would
not be able to fully utilize its production potential. In the
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short term, potential production growth will be limited by
the OPEC+ agreement obligations, while further down
the line crude output will naturally decline due to resource
base depletion. The technological scenario returns ﬁgures
closer to theoretical production potential; while baseline is
20% lower (Fig. 6).
It is worth noting, that the calculations results do not
indicate any substantial market limitations for Russian
Table 2. Scenario assumptions.
Indicator Period Unit Probable scenario
Demography and economy
Global population 2015 Billion people 7,40
2020 7,80
2030 8,50
2040 9,20
Global annual GDP growth 2015 % 2,80
2020 3,30
2030 3,00
2040 2,50
Average global per capita
GDP
2015 US$1,000 2014 15,30
2040 24,70
Geopolitics, state energy policies, climate
Geopolitical risks – – Local conﬂicts
State energy policies – – Incomplete implementation of plans
CO2 prices 2015, Europe US$2014/toe 8
2015, Asia 0
2040, Europe 35
2040, Asia 25
Global ETS state – – Undeveloped, but regional carbon markets emerge
Technology
Technological development – – No technological breakthroughs are expected. It is assumed
that only those technologies that are currently being tested
will be introduced. Existing technologies will undergo a
gradual increase in their cost effectiveness, along with a
continuation of the existing trend of declining GDP energy
intensity in each country.
Transfer of technologies – – Limited
Source: Makarov et al. (2016).
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crude exports, as long as breakeven costs remain at
25–50 $/boe. Thus, faltering production is predominantly
caused by internal factors, which should become the main
focus of government and oil companies.
On the other hand, market niches for Russian petroleum
products are shrinking in the forecast period, as Europe is
well on the way to reduce fossil fuel consumption, while
the competition on Asian–Paciﬁc is extremely high with
both other exporters and local reﬁneries. Consequently,
after 2025 reﬁning volumes turn out well below the
tax-incentivized 250 million tons (Fig. 7).
Given all that, even under the relatively unfavorable
conditions of Baseline scenario, despite reduction in crude
and products exports, Russia will remain one of the world’s
most prominent liquid hydrocarbons suppliers with over
250 mtoe in 2040, second only to Saudi Arabia. In Techno-
logical scenario crude oil exports will even increase,
compared to 2018, reaching 290 mtoe and 360 mtoe of over-
all liquid exports in 2040 (Fig. 8).
5 Conclusion
The comprehensive research of the prospects of Russian oil
sector under the stress of internal challenges and external
limitations has demonstrated that the industry still
possesses considerable long-term resilience to keep the coun-
try amongst global energy leaders in the forecast period and
beyond. However some alarming trends have been identi-
ﬁed that require immediate attention by the government
and oil companies to prevent a pronounced cumulative neg-
ative impact on both oil industry and national economy in
the future:
First and foremost, depletion of the resource base is the
most serious challenge for the sustainability of oil industry.
As indicated by our assessment, Russia may experience
production decline as early as 2025, which means that
preventive measures should be taken urgently. There are
two courses of action that should be undertaken by oil com-
panies simultaneously. Firstly, much of the vast Russian
territory remains scarcely explored, even some of the well-
developed oil basins still yield substantial discoveries. Thus,
large-scale implementation of state-of-the-art geological
surveillance has very good prospects of expanding the
resource base. Secondly, as demonstrated by US shale
revolution and, previously, Canadian heavy oil boom, the
introduction of new extraction technologies can skyrocket
production from reserves previously deemed uneconomical
or unobtainable. Russia, being among the world’s leaders
in estimated unconventional oil resources (Kapustin and
Grushevenko, 2018b), needs to utilize this potential by
developing the relevant approaches in the shortest time
possible. The sanctions became a major setback for this,
however. So much so, that we did not account for most of
the stranded shelf projects and were very conservative in
regards to Bazhen oil in our calculations. This, however,
leaves some room for optimism, as if the sanctions are eased
or domestic solutions are developed, the actual production
potential may actually eclipse our best estimates.
Naturally, these efforts will need extensive government
support, as they require considerable investment from oil
companies. It is the state regulator’s duty to stimulate these
investments with ﬂexible tax policy and targeted incentives
as well as providing transport infrastructure expansion.
With the joint labor of government and oil companies, it
is possible for Russia to maintain its leading role in crude
production and exports; otherwise the future may be bleak.
The situation for oil reﬁning industry is much less dire,
but rather ambiguous. The modernization of 2008–2016
period managed to considerably uplift Russian oil reﬁning
in terms of efﬁciency and products quality, as indicated in
our previous research (Kapustin and Grushevenko,
2018a). However, it was not carried out in its entirety
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Fig. 8. Russian liquid hydrocarbons exports forecast. Source: Authors’ research.
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and further prospects are uncertain. Our calculations indi-
cate that, unlike crude oil, Russian reﬁned products will
ﬁnd it increasingly hard to ﬁnd niches in the international
markets even under fairly conservative scenario assump-
tions. Domestic demand does not provide incentives for
growth either. Contemporary trends and energy security
concerns dictate government support of alternative fuels
and interfuel competition. Coupled with struggling
economic growth, internal demand will demonstrate negligi-
ble or even negative increment in the forecast period. As
such, it would be sensible for the oil companies to focus
on maintaining the attained technological level of oil reﬁn-
ing, instead of carrying on with large scale investments,
while the Government should probably turn its support
to other sectors.
The most important implication that Russian govern-
ment needs to recognize as soon as possible is that the era
of cheap oil and hydrocarbon windfall proﬁts is coming to
an end. While oil industry is capable of maintaining produc-
tion and exports, given the aforementioned efforts, it is
inevitable that each successive barrel of crude will bring less
and less net revenues for the state budget, due to the neces-
sary tax cuts and production costs growing. In essence, it
means, that while petroleum industry will remain a crucial
part of the country’s economy as a source of jobs, energy
security, taxes and in no small part, geopolitical inﬂuence,
Russia cannot hope to rely on it as the basis of national
ﬁnancial stability for much longer. Thus it is essential for
the Government to redouble efforts on economic diversiﬁca-
tion and long overdue movement away from hydrocarbon
export dependency.
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Appendix I
The concept of trans-Siberian oil pipeline has been under
consideration since the late 1960’s, however economic and
political circumstances have time after time put a hold on
the project. By the mid-2000s the need to diversify crude
exports and to gain access to the booming Asian hydrocar-
bon markets have become apparent and the decision to go
forward with building a pipeline stretching over 2000 km
has been made in 2004. Given the scale of construction, it
was decided to implement the project in several stages, with
bringing its capacity to the planned 80 million tons of oil
per year by 2030.
In April 26, 2006 the ﬁrst joint of the oil pipeline was
welded in the Taishet area which marked the beginning of
construction of the ﬁrst 15 million ton stage of ESPO. As
part of the ﬁrst stage of the ESPO, the oil pipeline was laid
along the Taishet – Lensk – Neryungri – Skovorodino route,
and a “Specialized offshore oil port “Kozmino”” in
Primorsky Krai was built and put into operation. After
three years of continuous construction, after a number of
setbacks and delays, the pipeline system began to be ﬁlled
with oil on July 8, 2009.
Before the construction of the second stage of the oil
pipeline system, oil from the East Siberian ﬁelds was
exported to the countries of the Asia–Paciﬁc region only
half of the way through the pipeline, and then it was
reloaded into railway tanks. In order to minimize ﬁnancial
and time expenses, the construction of the second stage of
the ESPO pipeline began in 2010.
The beginning of construction of ESPO-II is considered
to be January 13, 2010. It was then that the ﬁrst joint was
welded at 3806 km of the ESPO route near the station in
the Jewish Autonomous region. The ﬁnal joint of the linear
part of the second stage of the ESPO was welded in
Primorsky Krai less than two years after the start of
construction – September 9, 2011. On December 25, 2012,
two years ahead of schedule, the launch ceremony of the
second stage was held in Khabarovsk. And in January
2013 the ﬁrst oil has been transported all the way from
Taishet to the Paciﬁc shores. At the moment, ESPO is
among the world’s longest oil pipelines of more than
4500 km and annual capacity of over 55 million tons
(Fig. A1).
Despite initial criticism by political opposition and
environmentalists, the ESPO pipeline proved to be a suc-
cess, stimulating the development of Eastern Siberian oil
and the whole of Far Eastern regions of the country.
Transneft is continuing the works on sustaining and expan-
sion of the pipeline, due to high demand for transport
capacities in the region.
Fig. A1. The map of ESPO pipeline. Source: Transneft.
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